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Abstract
The timed automaton framework of Alur and Dill is a natural choice
for the specification of partially synchronous distributed systems. The past
has shown, however, that verification of these systems by model checking
usually is very difficult. Therefore, model checking techniques have thus
far not really been used for their design, even though these techniques are
widely used in other areas, e.g., hardware verification. The present paper
demonstrates that the revolutionary development of both the usability and
the efficiency of model checking tools may change this. It is shown that a
complex partially synchronous distributed algorithm can easily be modeled
with the Uppaal model checker, and that it is possible to analyze some
interesting and non-trivial instances with reasonable computational resources.
Clearly, such analysis results can greatly support the design of these systems:
model checking tools may provide valuable early feedback on subtle design
errors and hint at system invariants that can subsequently be used in the
general correctness proof.
Keywords: Distributed systems, agreement algorithm, partially synchronous
model, model checking, timed automata.
1 Introduction
Distributed systems are in general hard to understand and to reason about due to
their complexity and inherent non-determinism. That is why formal models play
an important role in the design of these systems: one can specify the system and its
properties in an unambiguous and precise way, and it enables a formal correctness
proof. The I/O-automata of Lynch and Tuttle provide a general formal modeling
framework for distributed systems [21, 20, 19]. Although the models and proofs in
this framework can be very general (e.g., parameterized by the number of processes
or the network topology), the proofs require – as usual – a lot of human effort.
Model checking provides a more automated, albeit less general way of prov-
ing the correctness of systems [13]. The approach requires the construction of a
∗Supported by the European Community Project IST-2001-35304 Ametist (Advanced Meth-
ods for Timed Systems), http://ametist.cs.utwente.nl/.
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model of the system and the specification of its correctness properties. A model
checker then automatically computes whether the model satisfies the properties or
not. The power of model checkers is that they are relatively easy to use compared
to manual verification techniques or theorem provers, but they also have some
clear drawbacks. In general only instances of the system can be verified (i.e.,
the algorithm can be verified for 5 processes, but not for n processes). Further-
more, model checking suffers from the state space explosion problem: the number
of states grows exponentially in the number of system components. This often
renders the verification of realistic systems impossible.
Model checkers still can be useful for the design of distributed systems. Con-
sider the following approach. First, one specifies the system in the language of
the model checker. This can reveal inconsistencies and incompletenesses. Second,
the model can be simulated using the model checker. This also may reveal design
errors in an early stage of the design phase. When one is satisfied with the model,
then, as a third step, one can try to verify some interesting properties for small
instances of the system. Finally, if one has enough faith in the correctness of the
system, then one can start with the construction of a general proof (either by hand
or with a theorem prover), which in general is a very time-consuming task. The
intuitions that one has gotten during the work with the model checker (and the
invariants that were possibly obtained for some instances in the third step) can,
however, make the construction of the proof less cumbersome. The work of [18]
and [22] demonstrates the feasibility and effectiveness of the first three steps of
this approach. In both papers, the Spin model checker is used to give feedback
on IEEE standards that at that time were still under development.
A class of distributed systems for which model checking has yielded no apparent
successes is the subclass of partially synchronous systems in which (i) message
delay is bounded by some constant, and (ii) many messages can be in transit
simultaneously. In the partially synchronous model, system components have
some information about timing, although the information might not be exact.
It lies between the extremes of the synchronous model (the processes take steps
simultaneously) on one end and the asynchronous model (the processes take steps
in an arbitrary order and at arbitrary relative speeds) on the other end [19].
The timed automata framework of Alur and Dill [2] is a natural choice for the
specification of such systems (as is the Timed I/O-automaton framework [17],
which, however, does not support model checking). Verification of these systems
by model checking is often very difficult since every message needs its own clock to
model the bounds on message delivery time. This is disastrous since the state space
of a timed automaton grows exponentially in the number of clocks. Moreover, if
messages may get lost or message delivery is unordered, then on top of that also
the discrete part of the model explodes rapidly.
Many realistic algorithms and protocols fall into the class of “difficult” partially
synchronous systems. Examples include the sliding window protocol for the reli-
able transmission of data over unreliable channels [23, 11], a protocol to monitor
the presence of network nodes [9, 16], and the ZeroConf protocol whose purpose
is to dynamically configure IPv4 link-local addresses [10, 24]. Furthermore, the
agreement algorithm described in [3] (see also Chapter 25 of [19]) also is a partially
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synchronous system that is difficult from the perspective of model checking. The
analysis of this algorithm with the Uppaal model checker is the subject of the
present paper. It is shown that some non-trivial instances can be formally verified
(which has not been done before to the author’s knowledge). Our results provide
evidence that the class of partially synchronous distributed systems, which is an
important class since many realistic algorithms and protocols fall into it, is within
reach of the current state-of-the-art model checking tools.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The timed automaton
framework and the Uppaal model checker are briefly introduced in Section 2.
Section 3 then presents an informal description of the distributed algorithm of
[3], which consists of two parts: a timeout task and a main task. Section 4 de-
scribes the Uppaal model that is used to verify the timeout task. A model for
the parallel composition of the timeout task and the main task is proposed in
Section 5. Two properties of the timeout task that have been verified in Section
4 are used to reduce the complexity of this latter model. Finally, Section 6 dis-
cusses the present work. The Uppaal models from this paper are available at
http://www.cs.ru.nl/ita/publications/papers/martijnh/.
2 Timed Automata
This section provides a very brief overview of timed automata and their core
semantics, and of the Uppaal tool, which is a model checker for timed automata.
The reader is referred to [6] and [8] for more details.
Timed automata are finite automata that are extended with real valued clock
variables [2]. Let X be a set of clock variables, then the set Φ(X) of clock con-
straints φ is defined by the grammar φ := x ∼ c |φ1∧φ2, where x ∈ X, c ∈ N, and
∼∈ {<,≤,=,≥, >}. A clock interpretation ν for a set X is a mapping from X
to R+, where R+ denotes the set of positive real numbers including zero. A clock
interpretation ν for X satisfies a clock constraint φ over X, denoted by ν |= φ,
if and only if φ evaluates to true with the values for the clocks given by ν. For
δ ∈ R+, ν + δ denotes the clock interpretation which maps every clock x to the
value ν(x) + δ. For a set Y ⊆ X, ν[Y := 0] denotes the clock interpretation for X
which assigns 0 to each x ∈ Y and agrees with ν over the rest of the clocks. We
let Γ(X) denote the set of all clock interpretations for X.
A timed automaton then is defined by a tuple (L, l0,Σ, X, I, E), where L is a
finite set of locations, l0 ∈ L is the initial location, Σ is a finite set of labels, X is a
finite set of clocks, I is a mapping that labels each location l ∈ L with some clock
constraint in Φ(X) (the location invariant) and E ⊆ L×Σ×Φ(X)×2X×L is a set
of edges. An edge (l, a, φ, λ, l′) represents a transition from location l to location
l′ on the symbol a. The clock constraint φ specifies when the edge is enabled and
the set λ ⊆ X gives the clocks to be reset with this edge. The semantics of a timed
automaton (L, l0,Σ, X, I, E) is defined by associating a transition system with it.
A state is a pair (l, ν), where l ∈ L, and ν ∈ Γ(X) such that ν |= I(l). The initial
state is (l0, ν0), where ν0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ X. There are two types of transitions
(let δ ∈ R+ and let a ∈ Σ). First, ((l, ν), (l, ν + δ)) is a δ-delay transition iff
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ν + δ′ |= I(l) for all 0 ≤ δ′ ≤ δ. Second, ((l, ν), (l′, ν ′)) is an a-action transition iff
an edge (l, a, φ, λ, l′) exists such that ν |= φ, ν ′ = ν[λ := 0] and ν ′ |= I(l′). Note
that location invariants can be used to specify progress, and that they can cause
time deadlocks.
The transition system of a timed automaton is infinite due to the real valued
clocks. The region and zone constructions, however, are finite abstractions that
preserve Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL) formulas and a subset of TCTL
formulas (most notably reachability) respectively [1, 14]. This enables the appli-
cation of finite state model checking techniques as implemented by Uppaal for
instance.
The Uppaal modeling language extends the basic timed automata as defined
above with bounded integer variables and binary blocking (CCS style) synchro-
nization. Systems are modeled as a set of communicating timed automata. The
Uppaal tool supports simulation of the model and the verification of reachability
and invariant properties. The question whether a state satisfying φ is reachable
can be formalized as EF(φ). The question whether φ holds for all reachable states
is formalized as AG(φ). If such a property is not satisfied, then Uppaal can give
a run that proves this. This run can be replayed in the simulator, which is very
useful for debugging purposes.
3 Description of the Algorithm
This section presents an informal description of an algorithm that solves the prob-
lem of fault-tolerant distributed agreement in a partially synchronous setting [3]
(see also Chapter 25 of [19]). A system of n processes, denoted by p1, ..., pn, is
considered, where each process is given an input value and at most f processes
may fail. Each process that does not fail must eventually (termination) choose
a decision value such that no two processes decide differently (agreement), and
if any process decides for v, then this has been the input value of some process
(validity). The process’s computation steps are atomic and take no time, and two
consecutive computation steps of a non-faulty process are separated c1 to c2 time
units. The processes can communicate by sending messages to each other. The
message delay is bounded by d time units, and message delivery is unordered.
Furthermore, messages cannot get lost nor duplicated. The constant D is defined
as d + c2. As mentioned above, f out of the n processes may fail. A failure may
occur at any time, and if a process fails at some point, then an arbitrary subset
of the messages that would have been sent in the next computation step, is sent.
No further messages are sent by a failed process. It is convenient to regard the
algorithm, which is run by every process, as the merge of a timeout task and a
main task, such that a process’s computation step consists of a step of the timeout
task followed by a step of the main task.
The goal of the of the timeout task is to maintain the running state of all other
processes. This is achieved by broadcasting an (alive, i) message every computa-
tion step. If process pi has run for sufficiently many computation steps without
receiving an (alive, j) message (from process pj), then it assumes that pj halted ei-
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ther by decision or by failure1. Figure 1 contains the description of a computation
step of the timeout task of process pi in precondition-effect style. The boolean
variable blocked is used by the main task to stop the timeout task. Initially, this
boolean is false. It is set to true if the process decides. The other state compo-
nents are a set halted ⊆ {1, ..., n}, initially ∅, and for every j ∈ {1, ..., n} a counter
counter(j), initially set to −1. Additionally, every process has a message buffer
buff (a set), initially ∅.
Precondition:
¬ blocked
Effect:
broadcast((alive,i))
for j := 1 to n do
counter(j) := counter(j) + 1
if (alive,j ) ∈ buff then
remove (alive,j ) from buff
counter(j) := 0
else if counter(j) ≥ bD
c1
c+ 1 then
add j to halted
od
Figure 1: The timeout task for process pi.
Two properties of the timeout task have been proven in [3].
A1 If any pi adds j to halted at time t, then pj halts, and every message sent
from pj to pi is delivered strictly before time t.
A2 If pj halts at time t, then every pi either halts or adds j to halted by time
t+ T , where T = D + c2 · (bDc1 c+ 1).
Figure 2 contains the description of a computation step of the main task of
process pi in precondition-effect style. Apart from the input value vi and the state
components used by the timeout task, there is one additional state component,
namely the rounds counter r, initially zero. The input values are assumed to be
either zero or one for simplicity2.
Three main results that are obtained in [3] are the following.
M1 (Agreement, Lemma 5.9 of [3]). No two processes decide on different values.
M2 (Validity, Lemma 5.10 of [3]). If process pi decides on n, then n = vj for
some process j.
M3 (Termination, Theorem 5.1 of [3]). The upper bound on the time to reach
agreement equals (2f − 1)D +max {T, 3D}.
1The message complexity of this algorithm is quite high. Recently, an alternative with an
adjustable “probing load” for each node has been proposed in [9] and analyzed in [16].
2An extension to an arbitrary input domain is discussed in [3].
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Precondition:
r = 0 ∧ vi = 1
Effect:
broadcast((0,i))
r := 1
Precondition:
r = 0 ∧ vi = 0
Effect:
broadcast((1,i))
decide(0)
Precondition:
r ≥ 1 ∧ ∃j (r, j) ∈ buff
Effect:
broadcast((r, i))
r := r + 1
Precondition:
r ≥ 1 ∧ ∀
j /∈halted (r − 1, j) ∈ buff ∧
¬∃j (r, j) ∈ buff
Effect:
broadcast((r + 1, i))
decide(r mod 2)
Figure 2: The main task for process pi.
4 Verification of the Timeout Task
4.1 Modeling the Timeout Task
Note that every process runs the same algorithm, and that the timeout parts of
different processes do not interfere with each other. Therefore, only two processes
are considered, say pi and pj . By the same argument, only one direction of the
timeout task is considered: pi (Observer) keeps track of the running state of pj
(Process). As required by the algorithm, Process broadcasts an alive message at
each computation step. This action is modeled by a b-synchronization, which ac-
tivates an instance of the broadcast template, shown in Figure 3. This template is
parameterized with a constant id in order to give each instance a unique identifier.
Clearly, the Uppaal model must ensure output enabledness of Process: it must be
able to broadcast the alive message when it wants to. Since the maximal number
of simultaneous broadcasts equals b dc1 c+ 2, this many instances of the broadcast
template must be present in the model. The guard turn() and the assignments to
active[id] implement a trick to reduce the reachable state space by exploiting the
symmetry among the broadcast instances3. After a b-synchronization, a broadcast
automaton may spend at most d time units in location sending, which is modeled
using the local clock x. The actual message delivery is modeled by the assignment
alive=true on the transition back to idle. The reset of the global clock t is used
for the verification of property A1.
idle sending
x<=d
turn()
b?
active[id]=true, x=0
alive=true, active[id]=false, t=0
Figure 3: The broadcast template.
init
x<=c2
comp
x<=c2
halted
x==c2
x>=c1
b!
x=0
b!
x=0
x=0
Figure 4: The Process automaton.
3The next release of Uppaal will hopefully support symmetry reduction, which can automat-
ically exploit the symmetry among broadcast automata [15].
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Figure 4 shows the Uppaal automaton of the merge of the timeout task and
abstract main task of Process (the only functionality of the main task is to halt).
It has one local clock x to keep track of the time between two consecutive com-
putation steps. The Process automaton must spend exactly c2 time units in the
initial location init before it takes the transition to location comp (the reason for
this is explained below). It then immediately either fails or does a computation
step. Failure of Process is modeled by the pair of edges to halted, which models
the non-deterministic choice of the subset of messages to send. The computation
step is modeled by the self-loop and by the upper transition to halted (a decision
transition that blocks the timeout task)4. Note that x is reset on every edge to
halted for verification purposes.
init
x<=c2
comp
x<=c2
halted
x==c2
x>=c1
update(),
x=0
x>=c1
update()
Figure 5: The Observer automaton.
void update ()
{
cnt++;
if (alive)
{
alive = false;
cnt = 0;
}
has_halted = cnt>=(D/c1)+1;
}
Figure 6: The update() function.
Figure 5 shows the automaton for the Observer, which is the composition of
an abstract main task (whose only purpose again is to halt) and the “receiving
part” of the timeout task. It has a local integer variable cnt, initialized to −1, and
a local clock x. Furthermore, the boolean has halted models whether Process ∈
haltedObserver .
The Observer automaton must first spend c2 time units in the initial location
before taking the edge to location comp. Then, it must immediately either do a
computation step or fail. The computation step is modeled by the self-loop and
by the upper transition to halted. The assignment update() updates the variables
cnt, has halted and alive as specified in Figure 6. Failure is modeled by the lower
edge to halted.
Both the Observer automaton and the Process automaton must first spend c2
time units in their initial location. This is a modeling trick to fulfill the requirement
from [3] that “every process has a computation or failure event at time 0”. I.e.,
our model starts at time −c2. (If Uppaal would allow the initialization of a clock
to any natural number, then both initial locations can be removed.)
4A straightforward model contains a third edge to halted with the guard x ≥ c1, the synchro-
nization b!, and the reset x = 0. Such an edge is, however, “covered” by the present upper edge
to halted and can therefore be left out
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4.2 Verifying the Timeout Task
Property A1 is translated to the following invariant property of the Uppaal model
(a broadcast automaton with identifier i is denoted by bi):
AG
(
has halted −→
(Process.halted ∧ ∀i bi.idle ∧ t > 0)
)
(1)
The state property ∀i bi.idle ∧ t > 0 ensures that all messages from Process
to Observer are delivered strictly before the conclusion of Observer that Process
halted. Property A2 is translated as follows:
AG
 (Process.halted ∧ Process.x > T )−→
(Observer .halted ∨ has halted)
 (2)
The branching time nature of A2 is specified by this invariance property due
to the structure of our model: Process.x measures the time that has been elapsed
since Process arrived in the location halted.
Properties (1) and (2) have been verified for the following parameter values:
• c1 = 1, c2 = 1 and d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10}.
• c1 = 1, c2 = 2 and d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and
• c1 = 9, c2 = 10 and d ∈ {5, 9− 11, 15, 20, 50}.
5 Verification of the Algorithm
The Uppaal model of the parallel composition of the main task and the timeout
task, which is used to verify properties M1–M3, is presented in this section. It is
assumed that every process receives an input by time zero (synchronous start),
since otherwise the state space becomes too big to handle interesting instances.
If the timeout task is modeled explicitly, then many alive messages must be send
every computation step, which results in an overly complex model. Using proper-
ties A1 and A2, however, the explicit sending of alive messages can be abstracted
away.
5.1 Modeling the Algorithm
Figure 7 shows the Uppaal template of the behavior of the algorithm. This
template is parameterized with two constants, namely its unique identifier id, and
a boolean mayFail which indicates whether this process may fail5.
Similar to the model of the timeout task, a process first waits c2 time units
in its initial location. Then, it non-deterministically chooses an input value on
an edge to wait. The global clock t is used to measure the running time of the
5Again, this is a trick that exploits the symmetry of processes to reduce the reachable state
space.
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timeout
finished
main
initial
x<=c2
update
x<=T
wait
x<=c2
to_ok[id]?
x>=c1
to[id]!
x=0
stop[id]!
allInformed()
pre4()
b[id]!
bv[id]=r+1,
dec[id]=r%2,
reset()
pre2()
b[id]!
bv[id]=1,
dec[id]=0,
reset()
pre1() b[id]! bv[id]=0, r=1
pre3() b[id]! bv[id]=r, r++
!(pre1() || pre2() || pre3() || pre4())
x==c2
v[id]=0,
t=0
x==c2
v[id]=1,
t=0
failCount()<f && mayFail
b[id]!
bv[id]=failValue(), 
failed[id]=true,
reset()
Figure 7: The process template.
algorithm. Then it either starts a computation step or fails. A computation step
first activates the timeout automaton of the process, which is described below, on
the edge to timeout. When the timeout automaton finishes (it may have updated
the halted set), the transition to main is taken. Then there are five possibilities:
one of the one of the four preconditions of the main task transitions is satisfied
(note that they are all mutually exclusive), or none of them is satisfied. In the first
case, the specified actions are taken, and in the second case nothing is done. The
committed locations (those with a “C” inside) specify that a computation step is
atomic and that it takes no time (if a committed location is active, then no delay
is allowed and the next action transition must involve a committed component).
Note that broadcasting the message (m, i) is achieved by assigning m to bv[id] on
an edge with a b[id] -synchronization. Figure 8 shows the functions that implement
the preconditions of the four transitions of the main task (see also Figure 2).
bool pre1 ()
{
return r==0 && v[id]==1;
}
bool pre3 ()
{
int j;
if (r<=0)
return false;
for (j=0; j<N; j++)
if (buff[id][r][j])
return true;
return false;
}
bool pre2 ()
{
return r==0 && v[id]==0;
}
bool pre4 ()
{
int j;
if (r<=0 || pre3())
return false;
for (j=0; j<N; j++)
if (!halted[id][j] &&
!buff[id][r-1][j])
return false;
return true;
}
Figure 8: The preconditions for the four transitions of the main task.
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A failure is modeled by the edge from wait to update. This edge is only enabled
if less than f failures already have occurred. The failValue() function computes
the value that would have been broadcast during the next computation step.
In location update the process has halted either by decision or by failure.
It can stay there for a maximum of T time units and it provides a stop[id] -
synchronization. This is used for the abstraction of the timeout task, which is
explained below. When all other processes have been informed that this process
has halted (allInformed() returns true), then the transition to location finished is
enabled.
Similar to the model of the timeout task, the broadcasts are modeled by in-
stances of the broadcast template which is shown in Figure 9.
sending
x<=d
idle
bv[id]<0
b[id]?
bv[id]=0
shouldDeliver(2)
deliver(2)
shouldDeliver(0)
deliver(0)
allDelivered()
reset()
bv[id]>=0 && turn()
b[id]?
initialize(), x=0
shouldDeliver(1)
deliver(1)
Figure 9: The broadcast template.
The template is parameterized with two constants, namely id, the identifier of
the process automaton this broadcast automaton belongs to, and bid, an identifier
that is unique among the other broadcast automata of process automaton id. Note
that this template is tailored to a model with n = 3 (there are three self-loops
from location sending) for reasons of efficiency.
The broadcast automaton is started with a b[id] -synchronization. If the value
of bv[id] is smaller than zero, then nothing is done (this is convenient for modeling
in the process template). If the value is larger than or equal to zero and turn()
returns true6, then this broadcast automaton can start delivering the message that
has been passed to it in bv[id]. The shouldDeliver() and allDelivered() functions
ensure that it delivers all messages on time, but only if necessary. I.e., it is not
useful to deliver a message to a process that already has halted, since that message
is never used; it only increases the reachable state space.
Each process automaton has a separate timeout automaton that has two func-
tions. First, it is activated at the beginning of each computation step of the process
it belongs to in order to update the halted set of the process. Second, it serves
as a test automaton to ensure that the process it belongs to is output enabled7.
The timeout template is shown in Figure 10. It has one parameter, namely the
constant id, which refers to the process it belongs to.
6Similarly as in the model of the timeout task in the previous section, the guard turn() exploits
the symmetry between the broadcast automata of a single process to reduce reachable the state
space.
7In this model, the number of necessary broadcast automata is no longer easily to determine.
Therefore, an explicit check is useful.
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error
to_ok[id]!
mayAdd(2)
stop[2]?
halted[id][2]=true
mayAdd(1)
stop[1]?
halted[id][1]=true
mayAdd(0)
stop[0]?
halted[id][0]=true
to[id]?
allActive()
b[id]?
Figure 10: The timeout template.
The timeout template is tailored to n = 3 for reasons of efficiency. When it is
activated, it checks for each process j whether it may add it to the halted set, and
if so, it non-deterministically chooses whether to add it or not. Here properties
A1 and A2 of the timeout task come in. The function mayAdd() checks for a given
process j whether all messages from j to this process have been delivered. If not,
then it may not add j to halted (property A1). Furthermore, the synchronization
over the channel stop[j] must be enabled. In Figure 7 can be seen that this is only
the case for the T time units after j has halted (property A2). But if this process
has not added j to halted by that time, then j cannot proceed to location finished
(in that case allInformed() returns false), with a time deadlock as result. This is
exactly the case when T − pi.x < c1 − pj .x for processes i and j.
The second function of the timeout template is implemented by the edge to
the error location. This location is reachable if the process wants to broadcast
and all its broadcast automata are active already. In a correct model, the error
location therefore is not reachable.
5.2 Verifying the Algorithm
Properties M1–M3 are translated as follows (where U is the upper bound on the
running time of the protocol as specified before).
AG
(
∀i,j deci ≥ 0 ∧ decj ≥ 0 −→ deci = decj
)
(3)
AG
(
∀i deci ≥ 0 −→ ∃j deci = vj
)
(4)
AG
(
(∃i pi.wait) −→ t ≤ U
)
(5)
The following properties are health checks to ensure that (i) the processes
are output enabled, and (ii) the only deadlocks in the model are those that are
expected.
AG
(
¬∃i Ti.error
)
(6)
AG
(
deadlock −→ (∀i pi.finished ∨
∃i,j pj .x− pi.x > T − c1)
)
(7)
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The properties (3)–(6) have been verified (using the convex-hull approximation
of Uppaal with a breadth-first search order) for the following parameter values:
• n = 3, f ∈ {0, 1}, c1 = 1, c2 = 1, and d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10},
• n = 3, f ∈ {0, 1}, c1 = 1, c2 = 2, and d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 10}, and
• n = 3, f ∈ {0, 1}, c1 = 9, c2 = 10, and d ∈ {5, 9, 10, 11, 15, 20, 50}.
The verification of any instance needs at most 1.5 GB of memory and at
most 30 minutes of time on a regular desktop computer. Property (7) has been
verified for a subset of the above parameter values, namely for the models with
the three smallest values for d in each item. This property is more difficult to
model check since it involves the deadlock state property, which disables Uppaal’s
LU-abstraction algorithm [5] (a less efficient one is used instead), and which is
computationally quite complex due to the symbolic representation of states.
6 Conclusions
Despite the fact that model checkers are in general quite easy to use (in the sense
that their learning curve is not so steep as for instance the one of theorem provers),
making a good model still is difficult. The algorithm that has been analyzed in
this paper, for instance, can quit easily be modeled “literally”. The message
complexity then is huge due to the many broadcasts of alive messages, with the
result that model checking interesting instances becomes impossible. This has
been solved by a non-trivial abstraction of the timeout task. Ideally of course,
model checkers can even handle such “naive” models. Fortunately, much research
still is aimed at improving these tools. For instance, the Uppaal model checker is
getting more and more mature, both w.r.t. usability as efficiency. An example of
the former is the recent addition of a C-like language. This makes the modeling
of the agreement protocol much easier, and makes the model more efficient. A
loop over an array, as for instance used in the pre3() and pre4() functions shown
in Figure 8, can now be encoded with a C-like function instead of using a cycle of
committed locations and/or an auxiliary variable. This saves the allocation and
deallocation of intermediate states and possibly a state variable. Other examples
of efficiency improvements of Uppaal are enhancements like symmetry reduction
[15] and the sweep line method [12], which are planned to be added to Uppaal
soon. Especially symmetry reduction would greatly benefit distributed systems,
which often exhibit full symmetry. Furthermore, current research also focuses on
distributing Uppaal, which may even give a super-linear speed-up [7, 4].
Summarizing, model checking tools become more and more applicable to the
design of distributed systems due to the steady increase of their usability and
efficiency. They may provide valuable early feedback on subtle design errors and
hint at system invariants that can subsequently be used in the general correctness
proof that is either constructed by hand or by use of a theorem prover. The present
paper has demonstrated that model checking now even is feasible for some small
yet interesting instances of an agreement algorithm which thus far was considered
12
out of reach for model checking technology. This result shows that the class of
partially synchronous systems is within reach of the current state-of-the art model
checking tools.
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